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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Randall Billups was the passenger in a car driven by a woman suspected of attempting
to obtain a package containing heroin. The car was stopped by Meridian police officers,
Mr. Billups was taken into custody and transported to the police station, he was given his
Miranda warnings, and he was arrested only after providing incriminating evidence.
Mr. Billups moved to suppress the incriminating evidence he provided arguing that he had been
arrested without probable cause, when the officers took him into custody, transported him to the
police station, and placed him into an interrogation room. Acknowledging that officers did not
obtain probable cause to arrest Mr. Billups until after he provided incriminating evidence at the
police station, the State argued that officers had merely “detained” Mr. Billups for the roughly
90 minutes between the time he was seized and the time he provided the incriminating evidence
at the police station. The district court adopted the State’s argument and denied Mr. Billups’
motion to suppress. A jury found Mr. Billups guilty of conspiracy to traffic in between 7 and 28
grams of heroin, and he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum 10-year fixed term.
Mr. Billups asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress as the
decision is inconsistent with well-established United States Supreme Court precedent that holds
the very conduct the officers engaged in in this case is a clear Fourth Amendment violation.
Furthermore, he asserts that the State will be unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the presentation of the illegally obtained evidence did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In November of 2014, employees at a Postal Annex store1 contacted law enforcement
about a suspicious package,2 and officers discovered the package contained a bindle of black tar
heroin wrapped in a scarf. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.3, L.1 – p.5, L.1.) Store employees told
Meridian Police Detective Kyle Ludwig, that similar packages had been picked up in the past
immediately after the package arrived by one of the mailbox’s renters, Alexa Hoffman.3
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.5, Ls.2-16.) Detective Ludwig seized the heroin, repackaged the
scarf, and asked Postal Annex employees to contact him when the package was picked up. (Tr.
Suppression Hearing, p.5, L.2 – p.6, L.4.)
A couple of hours later, the employees contacted the police department and Detective
Ludwig was told that “a white female had exited a white SUV that was occupied by an
additional party had gone in, retrieved the package, and … they had relocated to a nearby
medical plaza parking lot.” (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.6, Ls.7-16.) Although officers lost
sight of the SUV for a short time, Detective Ludwig eventually initiated a traffic stop.
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.21.) Additional officers assisted Detective Ludwig
in detaining Ms. Hoffman, who had been driving the SUV, and Randall Billups, who had been
riding in the passenger seat. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.7, L.22 – p.8, L.9; p.9, Ls.12-15.)
Detective Ludwig saw the scarf and a portion of the package on the center console, and a
drug dog alerted on the SUV. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.9, Ls.10-22.) A subsequent search
revealed an open-style beach bag on the passenger-side floorboard containing a digital scale, a

1

The Postal Annex is a shipping company that also offers office services and rents mailboxes.
(Tr. Trial, p.195, L.8 – p.196, L.7.)
2
Employees were suspicious and investigated the contents of the package, an envelope, because
it was partially opened and had a piece of cloth sticking out of it. (Tr. Trial, p.196, Ls.11-24.)
2

to-list that included a pay/owe ledger, and Ms. Hoffman’s driver’s license and financial
transaction card – nothing in the bag indicated that Mr. Billups was the owner. (Tr. Suppression
Hearing, p.9, Ls.2-11; p.14, L.19 – p.15, L.24.) The rest of the package was eventually found in
a garbage can on a nearby street. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.9, L.22 – p.10, L.9.)
The stop happened to occur in front of Mr. Hoffman’s residence, and her mother stood
“in the driveway and would approach the traffic stop and [she was] warned several times that
she just kind of needed to stay back and kind of let us do what we needed to do.”
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.11, L.20 – p.12, L.5.) After approximately 45 minutes, Mr. Billups
and Ms. Hoffman were taken by officers to the Meridian Police Department, and Mr. Billups
was placed into a locked interview room. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.10, Ls.10-24; p.17, Ls.423.) Although he did not know exactly when Mr. Billups had first been handcuffed, Detective
Ludwig had the handcuffs removed and he interviewed Mr. Billups. (Tr. Suppression Hearing,
p.10, L.25 – p.11, L.7; p.15, L.25 – p.17, L.3.) Detective Ludwig read Mr. Billups his Miranda4
rights, and Mr. Billups admitted that he knew Ms. Hoffman was picking up a package of heroin,
and she was going to give Mr. Billups some in exchange for him setting up drug sales for her.
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.12, L.6 – p.13, L.4.) After he made these admissions, Mr. Billups
granted Detective Ludwig’s request to search the contents of his cell phone, and Detective
Ludwig found text messages consistent with illegal drug sales. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.13,
Ls.5-12.)
During the approximately 90 minutes between the time Detective Ludwig stopped the
SUV to the time Mr. Billups made his admissions, he was never free to leave. (Tr. Suppression

3

The P.O. Box was registered to Ms. Hoffman and a person identified at trial as Brandon
Johnson. (Tr. Trial, p.200, Ls.13-15.)
4
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3

Hearing, p.13, Ls.13-17; p.17, L.4 – p.18, L.13.) When asked if Mr. Billups was “in custody,”
Detective Ludwig testified, “I wouldn’t say that he was in custody. It was definitely a custodial
interview where he was not free to leave. I would qualify it more along the lines of a Terry
stop.” (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.18, Ls.14-18.) Mr. Billups was not arrested until after he
made his incriminating statements. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.13, Ls.18-24.)
After a preliminary hearing, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Billups with
conspiracy to traffic between 7 and 28 grams of heroin (“in excess of nine (9) grams”), naming
Ms. Hoffman as a co-conspirator. (R., pp.41-53.) Mr. Billups filed a motion to suppress all
physical and testimonial evidence obtained “when law enforcement officers illegally detained
and searched [him] without an arrest or search warrant.” (R., pp.101-103.) In his memorandum
in support, Mr. Billups argued his arrest was not supported by probable cause, as it was based
solely on the fact that he was a passenger in a vehicle that contained controlled substances at
one time, and in which paraphernalia was found, without any indicia that Mr. Billups owned or
possessed either. (R., pp.104-112.) In its written objection, the State argued that from the time
Mr. Billups was seized until the time he provided his incriminating evidence, he was the subject
of an investigatory detention. (R., pp.117-122.) The State argued that, “the Defendant was not
arrested until the end of his interview.” (R., p.121.)
During the suppression hearing, the State conceded that Mr. Billups had standing to
raise his motion and then provided Detective Ludwig’s testimony. (Tr. Suppression Hearing,
p.1, L.7 – p.22, L.21.) The State did not attempt to argue that Detective Ludwig had probable
cause to arrest Mr. Billups until after he made his admissions at the police station; rather, the
State continued to argue that Mr. Billups was merely the subject of an investigatory detention
until that point. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.5.) The State acknowledged,

4

“[t]here was, approximately, an hour-and-a-half between the initial traffic stop and Detective
Ludwig developing probable cause for the arrest of Mr. Billups,” but argued that his detention
during this time was reasonable considering the seriousness of the events. Id.
Mr. Billups’ counsel argued, “this certainly goes far beyond the Terry stop. 45-minute
detention on scene, followed by taken into custody and transported to the Meridian City Police
Department. Being held there for a period of time in handcuffs. This is a de facto arrest.”
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.25, Ls.10-14.) Defense counsel continued,
Mr. Billups was not free to leave. Mr. Billups did not consent to being
placed into handcuffs. Mr. Billups did not consent to being placed in the back of
a patrol car and, then, subsequently, transported to the Meridian City Police
Department where he was held in a locked room in handcuffs until they were
ordered to be removed by [Detective] Ludwig. He was not free to leave
throughout the entire course of this time. It is a de facto arrest.
And, in the absence of probable cause or some other exception to the
warrant requirement for an unlawful seizure, I believe the court must suppress all
of the information that was gained from Mr. Billups in the way of statements
after he was – certainly, there were no statements or other evidence that were
located with regard to Mr. Billups at the scene. But any statements, and other
evidence that was gained from Mr. Billups, including access to his cell phone
after he was transported and subsequently interrogated, at the Meridian City
Police Department.
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.26, Ls.6-25.)
The district court held that Detective Ludwig had a reasonable articulable suspicion to
justify both the initial seizure and initial detention of Mr. Billups. (Tr. Suppression Hearing,
p.27, L.1 – p.30, L.9.) The court then found the following:
So, with that, the investigatory detention was not unlawfully protracted.
It was a reasonable period of time given the circumstances. Given the
circumstances related to Ms. Hoffman’s mother continuing to inject herself into
the investigation, the transport of Mr. Billups to the police station was
reasonable. The officers recognized that this was an investigatory detention and
a custodial interview.

5

To that extent, Mr. Billups was given his Miranda warnings and after his
Miranda warnings, he waived those rights knowingly and voluntarily and
consented to make statements. The defendant’s statements that he knew that he
was going to pick up a package of heroin; that he would typically receive heroin
in exchange for setting up opportunities to distribute the heroin and the text
message about the package and the heroin, certainly, gave a basis for an arrest
for this offense.
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.30, L.10 – p.31, L.2.) The district court denied Mr. Billups’ motion
to suppress. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.31, Ls.18-19.)
During the subsequent trial, Detective Ludwig testified about Mr. Billups’ admission
that he knew Mr. Hoffman was picking up a package of heroin and that he intended on selling
Ms. Hoffman’s heroin in exchange for a small amount of the heroin that he could ingest
himself. (Tr. Trial, p.376, L.13 – p.377, L.15; p.378, L.18 – p.379, L.20.)5 Detective Ludwig
also testified that Mr. Billups provided him with his cell phone which contained text messages
indicating the phone was used to set up drug deals, and photos taken of some of those text
messages were admitted as exhibits. (Tr. Trial, p.377, L.16 – p.378, L.17; p.383, L.5 – p.397,
L.4; Exs. 9 through 31b.)
The jury found Mr. Billups guilty and the district court sentenced him to the mandatory
minimum 10-year fixed term, with no indeterminate term. (R., pp.185-188, 200, 203-206.)
Mr. Billups filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.211-215.)

5

Citations to “Tr. Trial” in this brief refer to the 665-page transcript containing two pre-trial
hearings, the bulk of the trial proceedings, and the sentencing hearing.
6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Billups’s motion to suppress?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Billups’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), the United States Supreme Court found

a Fourth Amendment violation when officers seized then transported a robbery suspect to the
police station, where the suspect was not free to leave, and the officers lacked probable cause to
arrest. In the present case, officers seized Randall Billups without probable cause and took him
to the police station, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court erred in
denying Mr. Billups motion to suppress.
B.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Billups’ Motion To Suppress
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact,
which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct. App.
1996).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees citizens the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Its purpose is “to
impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of discretion by government officials,
including law enforcement agents, in order to ‘safeguard the privacy and security of individuals
against arbitrary invasions.’” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (quoting
Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)). If evidence is not seized either pursuant
to a valid warrant or pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the

8

evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search or seizure must be excluded as the “fruit of
the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless justified by a wellrecognized exception to the warrant requirement. See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see
also Dunaway, supra. An officer may detain and individual if the officer holds an objectively
reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual has been or is about to be engaged in
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1968). However, “the line is crossed when
the police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or
other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station, where he is
detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes.” Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816
(1985). “[S]uch seizures, at least where not under judicial supervision, are sufficiently like
arrests to invoke the traditional rule that arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable
cause.” Id.
1.

Mr. Billups Was Arrested Without Probable Cause In Violation Of His Fourth
Amendment Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Seizures

Mr. Billups agrees with the State’s concession, and the district court’s finding, that
officers had no probable cause to arrest him until after he provided the incriminating evidence.
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.5; p.27, L.1 – p.31, L.2.) However, the Court’s
finding that officers did not need to have probable cause to detain him and transport him
involuntarily to the police station is directly in contradiction to United States Supreme Court
precedent.
In Dunaway, officers picked up a suspect in a murder investigation at his neighbor’s
house, drove him to police headquarters in a police car, placed him in an interrogation room,

9

Mirandized him, and questioned him about the murder. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 203. The
defendant waived his right to counsel and made incriminating statements. Id. Because the
defendant did not voluntarily accompany the officers to the police station, the Supreme Court
found he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 207. Furthermore, the State
conceded that the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant until after he made his
incriminating statements. Id.
The State argued “the seizure of the petitioner did not amount to an arrest and was
therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment because the police had a ‘reasonable
suspicion’ that petitioner possessed ‘intimate knowledge about a serious and unsolved crime.’”
Id. (citation omitted.) The Supreme Court rejected the State’s claim and held the following:
the detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguishable from a
traditional arrest. Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found.
Instead, he was taken from a neighbor’s home to a police car, transported to a
police station, and placed in an interrogation room. He was never informed that
he was “free to go”; indeed, he would have been physically restrained if he had
refused to accompany the officers or had tried to escape their custody. The
application of the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of probable cause does not
depend on whether an intrusion of this magnitude is termed an “arrest” under
state law. The mere facts that petitioner was not told he was under arrest, was
not “booked,” and would not have had an arrest record if the interrogation had
proved fruitless … obviously do not make petitioner’s seizure even roughly
analogous to the narrowly defined intrusions involved in Terry [v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968)] and its progeny. Indeed, any “exception” that could cover a
seizure as intrusive as that in this case would threaten to swallow the general rule
that Fourth Amendment seizures are “reasonable” only if based on probable
cause.
Id at 212–13. Thus, the Dunaway Court found a Fourth Amendment violation.
The facts in Mr. Billups’ case are, in all relevant aspects, indistinguishable from the
facts in Dunaway.

Like the defendant in Dunaway, Mr. Billups was suspected of being

involved in a crime, placed in a police car, transported to the police station, and placed in an
interrogation room. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.3, L.1 – p.5, L.1; p.10, Ls.10-24; p.17, Ls.410

23.) Like the defendant in Dunaway, Mr. Billups was not free to leave and in fact had been
placed in handcuffs at some point. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.10, L.10 – p.11, L.7; p.15, L.25
– p.17, L.23.) Like the State of New York in Dunaway, the State of Idaho concedes that no
probable cause to arrest existed prior to Mr. Billups providing incriminating evidence during his
interrogation. (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.5 (prosecutor arguing, “[t]here was,
approximately, an hour-and-a-half between the initial traffic stop and Detective Ludwig
developing probable cause for the arrest of Mr. Billups[.]”) Finally, like the State of New York
in Dunaway, the State of Idaho argues in this case that Mr. Billups’ 90-minute detention,
complete with an involuntary ride to the police station in a police car, and being placed into a
locked interrogation room, was nevertheless justified as a Terry stop. Thus, like the defendant
in Dunaway, Mr. Billups’ detention “was in important respects indistinguishable from a
traditional arrest.” Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 212-23.
The Dunaway holding is clear and binding. Mr. Billups’ Fourth Amendment right to be
free from an unreasonable seizure was violated, and the district court erred in finding otherwise.
2.

Mr. Billups’ Incriminating Statements Were Fruits Of His Unreasonable Seizure
And The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To Suppress

The State did not argue, and the district court did not address, the question of whether
Mr. Billups’ incrimination statements were the product of his illegal arrest. Regardless, the
undisputed facts found by the district court in this case demonstrate indisputably that that such
statements were a product of the illegal seizure and should be suppressed.
First, Miranda warnings cannot, in and of themselves, purge the taint of a Fourth
Amendment violation. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 601-02 (1975). In Brown detectives
broke into the defendant’s apartment searching for evidence of his involvement in a murder, and

11

took him into custody when he arrived home. Id. at 592. Although they lacked probable cause,
the officers took the defendant to the police station, Mirandized and question him, and the
defendant gave incriminating statements. Id. at 593-96.
In finding the incriminating statements should have been suppressed, the Supreme Court
first rejected the State’s argument that giving Miranda rights automatically purges the taint of
the illegal police action. “If Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint
of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment
violation, the effect of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted. Id. at 602 (citing
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 726-27 (1969).) The Court recognized that if Miranda
warnings by themselves could purge the taint of an unlawful arrest, officers would be
encouraged to engage in such actions knowing that any evidence derived from their illegal
conduct would nevertheless be admissible. Id. “Any incentive to avoid Fourth Amendment
violations would be eviscerated by making the warnings, in effect, a ‘cure-all,’ and the
constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures could be said to be reduced to ‘a
form of words.’” Id. at 202-03 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961).) Therefore, the
fact that Mr. Billups’ incriminating statements were “voluntary” for Fifth Amendment purposes,
does not mean they are necessarily admissible.
The Brown Court held that “[t]he question whether a confession is the product of a free
will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive.”
Id. at 597-603. The Court noted that the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the
presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the police misconduct
are all relevant considerations. Id. at 603-04 (citations omitted). The State bears the burden of
demonstrating the admissibility of statements made after an illegal arrest. Id. at 604.

12

The Brown Court held that the statements in that case should have been suppressed,
noting that they were separated from the illegal arrest by less than two hours, there was no
intervening event of significance, and the officers knew that they had no probable cause to
arrest the defendant, but did so anyway hoping to drum up incriminating evidence. Id. at 60405. The Court in Dunaway found “[t]he situation in this case is virtually a replica of the
situation in Brown,” and found that the evidence obtained in that case should have been
suppressed. Dunaway, 442 U.S. at 218. In Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003), the Supreme
Court found that the defendant’s unlawful arrest, the lack of any intervening events, and the
officers being conscientious that they lacked probable cause to arrest, all weighed in favor of
suppression, despite the fact that the unlawfully detained 17-year-old was Mirandized before
providing the incriminating statements.
Like the defendants in Brown, Dunaway, and Kaupp, the only factor weighing in favor
of admissibility of Mr. Billups’ incriminating statements is the fact that he was Mirandized prior
to giving them. The time between his initial detention and his incriminating statements was
approximately 90 minutes – 45 of which came when he was undoubtedly the subject of an
illegal arrest by virtue of being involuntarily transported to the police station.6 (Tr. Suppression
Hearing, p.10, Ls.10-14; p.13, Ls.13-17.) A handcuffed Mr. Billups was placed in a locked
interrogation room, and was only un-cuffed when Detective Ludwig interrogated him.
(Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.11, Ls.2-7.)

The State simply presented no evidence of any

6

Detective Ludwig certainly had a reasonable articulable suspicion justifying Mr. Billups’
initial detention, as there was at least a reasonable suspicion that Ms. Hoffman was involved in
dealing heroin and Mr. Billups was a passenger in her car when he pulled it over. While it is
not clear from the record when the initial detention actually turned into an illegal arrest, at the
very least, Mr. Billups was arrested when he was involuntarily placed in the police car and
transported to the police station – a detention in “important respects indistinguishable from a
traditional arrest.” Dunaway, 442 U.S. 212-13.
13

intervening circumstances that may indicate Mr. Billups’ incriminating statements were not the
product of his illegal arrest. Finally, Detective Ludwig implicitly recognized that he did not
have probable cause to arrest as he testified, “I wouldn’t say that he was in custody. It was
definitely a custodial interview where he was not free to leave. I would qualify it more along
the lines of a Terry stop.” (Tr. Suppression Hearing, p.18, Ls.14-18.) For the 35 years prior to
Detective Ludwig’s actions in this case, the United States Supreme Court has held that taking a
person into custody, involuntarily transporting them in a police car to a police station, and
placing them in an interrogation room prior to conducting a “custodial interview where [a
defendant] was not free to leave” is not a “Terry stop” – it is an arrest – and must be based on
probable cause in order to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Dunaway, supra.
Mr. Billups’ incriminating statements were the product of his illegal arrest, and the district court
erred in denying his motion to suppress these statements.
3.

Mr. Billups Decision To Provide His Cell Phone To Detective Ludwig Was A
Fruit Of His Unreasonable Seizure And The District Court Erred In Denying His
Motion To Suppress

Mr. Billups turned over his cell phone containing incriminating text messages only after
he was illegally arrested, and after he provided his incriminating statements. (Tr. Suppression
Hearing, Ls.5-12.) The digital information contained on an individual’s cell phone is protected
by the Fourth Amendment. See Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014). The exclusionary
rule applies when such information is obtained in violation of the owner’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Id.
As noted above, Mr. Billups was unlawfully arrested and he turned over his cell phone
during the subsequent interrogation.

The undisputed facts in this case demonstrate that

Detective Ludwig exploited the illegal arrest when he obtained in information contained on
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Mr. Billups’ cell phone. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488. As such, the district court erred in
denying Mr. Billups motion to suppress.
C.

The State Will Be Unable To Demonstrate The Error In Admitting The Incriminating
Evidence Obtained As A Result Of Mr. Billups’ Illegal Arrest Is Harmless Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt
Where the trial court’s error is made after a timely motion or contemporaneous

objection, the State bears the burden of proving the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, based upon the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). “To hold an
error as harmless, an appellate court must declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there
was no reasonable possibility that such evidence complained of contributed to the conviction.”
State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507 (1980) (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
The State will be unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury hearing
Detective Ludwig inform them that Mr. Billups admitted he knew Ms. Hoffman was picking up
heroin and that he was planning on helping her sell the heroin in exchange for a small amount
for himself, and the jury seeing photos of text messages showing Mr. Billups’ involvement in
Ms. Hoffman’s heroin business, did not contribute to the verdict. (Tr. Trial, p.376, L.13– p.379,
L.20; p.383, L.5 – p.397, L.4; Exs. 9 through 31b.) The only other evidence linking Mr. Billups
to the heroin, besides his physical proximity to Ms. Hoffman when she attempted to pick it up,
was Ms. Hoffman’s own self-serving testimony made in exchange for reduced charges.
(Tr. Trial, p.304, L.25 – p.365, L.3.) The incriminating evidence obtained through exploitation
of Mr. Billups’ illegal arrest undoubtedly contributed to his conviction for trafficking in heroin.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Billups respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and sentence.
DATED this 9th day of August, 2016.

_________/s/________________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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